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CAMPAIGN FINANCE, RACE, AND EQUALITY
DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN*
Lowenstein agrees with Terry Smith that egalitarian campaign
finance reformers may have given inadequate attention to the
implications of their proposals for racial groups. However, he
suggests that this inattention is symptomatic of a more general
tendency to avoid the complexities of equality as a goal for
campaign finance. Lowenstein expresses tentative skepticism of
whether equality can withstand theoretical and empirical scrutiny
as a rationale for campaign finance reform. He proposes instead
goals such as avoiding conflict of interest, enhancing electoral
competition, and reducing the resources devoted to fundraising.
He suggests that a good rule of thumb for pursuing each of these
goals is that reforms should make it easier, not harder, for
politicians to get money.
Legal scholars writing on campaign finance in recent years have
tended to divide into two camps. One group, including writers such
as Lillian BeVier,' Joel Gora,2 Bradley Smith,3 and Kathleen
Sullivan,4 has been hostile to regulation, primarily on libertarian
grounds. These scholars make policy arguments against most forms
of regulation-disclosure usually being the prominent exception-
and they make constitutional arguments that the regime initiated by
Buckley v. Valeo5 is too permissive of regulation.
The other, more numerous group of scholars, favors enhanced
regulation. Overwhelmingly, these writers support regulation in
order to promote the goal of equality. At the extreme, they argue
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments,
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1994); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and
Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1045 (1985).
2. See Joel M. Gora, Campaign Finance Reform: Still Searching Today for a Better
Way, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 137 (1997).
3. See BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM (2001).
4. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV.
311; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 663 (1997).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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that the present campaign finance system, inadequately regulated in
their opinion, violates the Equal Protection Clause.6 Few people will
hold their breath until the Supreme Court accepts that position, but
reformers argue, somewhat more plausibly, that contrary to Buckley,
promoting equality should be recognized as a compelling state
interest justifying regulation of campaign activity. And they urge
Congress, state legislatures, and state voters to adopt reforms that
they believe will promote equality. The many scholars in this camp
include Edward Foley and Richard Hasen.7
Terry Smith generally identifies himself with the latter group of
scholars,8 but he offers what appears to be intended as a friendly
amendment to their position. The goal of equality, he argues, cannot
be considered realistically in this country without serious
consideration of race. Such serious consideration, he claims, has been
lacking in writings of the egalitarian campaign finance reformers. On
this, his most central point, I believe Professor Smith is correct. But
he could strengthen his argument if he would clarify how he believes
race and the campaign finance debate bear on each other. His Article
seems to go back and forth between at least two quite distinct
domains.
One is the domain of constitutional doctrine. Smith's main point
is that Shaw v. Reno9 and its progeny are in tension, if not
inconsistent, with the recognition of speech and associational rights of
campaign donors and spenders in Buckley.1° I believe his attempt to
enlist the First Amendment against Shaw is a stretch, though I agree
with him that inhibiting the ability of minorities to participate in
redistricting negotiations is one of the most outrageous aspects of the
racial gerrymandering decisions." But I fail to see Smith's purpose
6. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1160 (1994).
7. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance
Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 Tx. L. REv. 1627 (1999); Richard L. Hasen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign
Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1996).
8. Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1520 (2001).
9. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
10. Smith, supra note 8, at 1519-20.
11. I made a similar argument in Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be
Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 825 (1998)
(stating that the "freedom to compete and negotiate will be especially hampered [by the
racial gerrymandering cases] in parts of the state where blacks and Hispanics reside."); see
also id. at 828-30 (showing that the racial gerrymandering doctrine forces minority
political groups to adopt legal grievance tactics to promote their redistricting goals,
because they are hamstrung in their use of ordinary political negotiating tactics).
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here. Is he trying to persuade the egalitarian reformers that they
ought to join him in opposing Shaw? Why bother, since most, if not
all of them, undoubtedly oppose Shaw already? More likely, he is
making an argument against Buckley, which he says he would like to
see overruled.12 But whether he is making an argument against Shaw
or against Buckley, surely there are more compelling and
straightforward reasons to oppose both decisions than their possible
inconsistency with each other.
The second domain that Smith sometimes refers to is the effect
of the campaign finance system on minority politicians. He asserts
that minorities cannot raise money as effectively as whites. 3 Living
as I do in California, where Willie Brown, an African American, may
have been more successful at fund-raising than any other politician in
the state's history, I am skeptical.14 Smith cites figures showing that
minority legislative candidates raise and spend less, on average, than
white candidates.' But such figures do not demonstrate, as Smith
apparently believes, that minority candidates are relatively
disadvantaged. For one thing, he does not break the figures down
between minority candidates running against other minorities and
those running against whites. 6 Two black candidates opposing each
12. Smith, supra note 8, at 1520. Of course, what he means is that he would like that
portion of Buckley declaring campaign expenditure limits unconstitutional to be
overruled.
13. Smith, supra note 8, at 1520.
14. See generally JAMES RICHARDSON, WILLIE BROWN: A BIOGRAPHY 315-33
(1996).
15. Smith, supra note 8, at 1473-74.
16. Smith refers to the Senate contest in which Jesse Helms outspent Harvey Gantt,
but that may reflect less an inability on Gantt's part to raise money and more Senator
Helms' well known fundraising prowess. The only African-American senator in a position
to run for reelection in recent years was Carol Moseley-Braun, who was defeated by Peter
Fitzgerald in Illinois in 1998. Fitzgerald received more than twice as much as Moseley-
Braun, $15.0 million to $7.2 million. However, Fitzgerald was a self-funded candidate who
put $11.7 million into his own campaign. See Federal Activity of 1997-98 Senate
Campaigns (1998), http:llwww.fec.gov/1996/states/ilsen6.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Thus, in actual fund-raising, Moseley-
Braun's $7.2 million compared favorably to Fitzgerald's $3.3 million. On the other hand,
Fitzgerald might have worked harder to raise money had he not been able to fund his own
campaign. A better comparison is between Moseley-Braun and the Democratic
incumbent who ran in the 1996 Senate election, Richard Durbin. Durbin raised $4.8
million in 1996. See Federal Activity of 1995-96 Senate Campaigns (1996),
http://www.fee.gov/1996/states/il_O2.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Thus, the Illinois experience does not support Smith's hypothesis.
Nor should that be a surprise. The parties and interest groups that fund hotly contested
elections have a large stake in partisan control of the two houses of Congress, and are not
likely to base their campaign finance activities on personal predilections.
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other in one district would not be disadvantaged because two white
candidates in a neighboring district spent twice as much.
To be sure, residents of a district are a major source of
contributions to legislative candidates and, as Smith argues, they will
be a less lucrative source in the low-income areas typically
represented by minority legislators. It does not follow, however, that
legislators from these districts are disadvantaged. To the contrary,
the minority incumbents benefit. The more difficult it is to raise
money, the less likely the incumbent legislator will face a well-
financed challenger. When they do not face well-financed
challengers, incumbents are extremely difficult to defeat.17 Not only
minority incumbent legislators benefit from the decreased likelihood
of strong electoral challenges. Their minority constituents are also
likely to benefit, because seniority has at least some importance in
most legislatures.
Now I would like to return to Professor Smith's general point,
that the egalitarian reformers have failed to consider race in their
conceptions of the equality that campaign finance reform is supposed
to support. In my opinion, the problem that Smith identifies is a part
of a larger problem, namely the failure of the egalitarian reformers to
give any serious attention to what kind of equality they expect
campaign finance regulation to accomplish and how they expect
regulation to accomplish equality of any sort. They speak
indifferently of equalizing the voice of every voter, of equalizing the
opportunities of all candidates, of equalizing "political power" in
general, and of remedying deficiencies in our society's distribution of
resources caused by present campaign finance systems, as if all these
were the same.
Manifestly, the subject I have just opened is much too large for
adequate discussion here. I shall simply state, in a conclusory way,
that I believe the only one of these goals that could have much chance
of standing up as a social desideratum to serious analytical scrutiny is
the last, namely the goal of general distributional fairness. Pursuit of
this goal by means of campaign finance regulation is almost certainly
doomed to failure on empirical grounds. There is no reason to
suppose that the general distributional effects of any imaginable form
of campaign finance reform would be more than slight. Whatever
effects did occur would be the indirect result of interaction with
17. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections:
New Evidence for Old Arguments, 34 AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 334 (1990).
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innumerable other factors and therefore would be entirely
unpredictable.
For these reasons, I have increasingly come to the view that
certain forms of campaign finance regulation are desirable, but for
reasons other than the promotion of equality. This is a rather solitary
position within legal academe, but it has consistently been the
position of a majority of the Supreme Court and, I believe, it is held
by many among those in the general public who think about
campaign finance issues. 18
Among the goals of campaign finance reform, I would include
reduction of undue influence or, as I prefer to call it, conflict of
interest; promotion of somewhat more electoral competition than we
have typically experienced in certain legislative races in recent
decades; and reduction of the time and energy politicians presently
must devote to fund-raising. Although working out the details is a
most difficult chore, there is one basic approach best calculated to
promote each of these goals: reduce the pressure by making it easier,
not harder, for politicians to get campaign money. The reasons are
simple. First, the harder it is to raise money, the more likely it is that
recipients will be influenced by the contributions they receive.
Second, the greatest barrier to more competitive legislative elections
is not the large amounts incumbents can spend but the inability of
many challengers to raise adequate amounts. Third, the easier it is to
get money, the less time and energy politicians will need to devote to
getting it.
Here is a simple idea: Quintuple the amount provided to
presidential candidates and quintuple all the limits contained in the
Federal Election Campaign Act. This quintupling plan is by no
means a perfect solution, but I believe that if it were put into force
today, it would quickly mitigate many of today's most salient sources
of discontent in campaign finance. For example, evasive devices such
18. The Supreme Court has upheld campaign restrictions only when it believed the
restrictions served anti-corruption purposes. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985). Corruption has been a major
theme in the public debate over campaign finance reform. Other than myself, few if any
legal academics have seriously defended reforms on anti-corruption grounds. Compare
Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 CHI. LEGAL F.
111, and David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform? 1995 CHI.
LEGAL F. 141 (both arguing that campaign finance reform is unjustifiable on anti-
corruption grounds but defensible, in theory at least, on egalitarian or equity grounds),
with Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on
Strauss and Cain, 1995 CHI. LEGAL F. 163 (defending the anti-corruption rationale).
Bruce Cain will be justifiably annoyed at being referred to as a legal academic, but that's
what he gets for publishing in legal journals.
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as sham issue advocacy funded by soft money or independent
spending would become less necessary if the public funding of
presidential campaigns were restored to a level adequate to fund a
campaign, and if higher contribution limits made it more feasible for
congressional candidates to fund their campaigns.
Professor Smith's central insight is as applicable to these ideas as
to egalitarian-based reforms. These reforms also should be vetted for
any particular effects on different groups, including racial and ethnic
groups. On first blush, the goals I have mentioned appear to be good
government goals in which all citizens have an interest, whatever their
race or ethnicity. But perhaps Professor Smith will some day find the
time to point his antennae in their direction.
In the meantime, I do not expect the egalitarian reformers to
give up their ground. If Professor Smith's Article prompts them not
only to press the particular inquiry he proposes but to engage in a
more comprehensive investigation into their egalitarian premises, he
will have performed a most valuable service.
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